State of Utah v. German Cruz Reyes : Reply Brief of Cross-Petitioner by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2004
State of Utah v. German Cruz Reyes : Reply Brief of
Cross-Petitioner
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kent R. Hart; Lisa J. Remal; Salt Lake Legal Defenders; counsel for appellant/cross-petitioner.
J. Frederic Voros Jr.; assistant attorney general; Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general; counsel for
petitioner/cross-respondent.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Reyes, No. 20040078.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2493
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent : 
v. : 
GERMAN CRUZ REYES : Case No. 20040078-SC 
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner : 
REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-PETITIONER 
Respondent and cross-petitioner, German Cruz Reyes, replies to the State's brief 
on cross certiorari review of the Court of Appeals' decision which reversed Mr. Reyes' 
two convictions for aggravated sexual assault, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
section 76-5-405 (Supp. 2002), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. Mr. Reyes remains incarcerated pending this appeal. 
KENT R. HART (6242) 
LISAJ.REMAL(2722) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
SaltLake£ity,UT84111 
Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner 
MARK SHURTLEFF (4666) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
J. FREDERICK VOROS, JR. (3340) 
ASSISTANT UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent 
F , L E D 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
Wo* 1 2 200*1 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent : 
v. : 
GERMAN CRUZ REYES : Case No. 20040078-SC 
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner : 
REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-PETITIONER 
Respondent and cross-petitioner, German Cruz Reyes, replies to the State's brief 
on cross certiorari review of the Court of Appeals' decision which reversed Mr. Reyes' 
two convictions for aggravated sexual assault, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
section 76-5-405 (Supp. 2002), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. Mr. Reyes remains incarcerated pending this appeal. 
KENT R. HART (6242) 
LISA J. REMAL (2722) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner 
MARK SHURTLEFF (4666) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
J. FREDERICK VOROS, JR. (3340) 
ASSISTANT UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
INTRODUCTION 1 
ANALYSIS 2 
MR. REYES' CASES AGREE THAT DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
AND THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SIMILAR COURT RULES 
REQUIRE TRIAL JUDGES TO REPEAT PRELIMINARY 
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW AT THE CLOSE OF THE 
EVIDENCE 2 
A. Case Law Supports the Court of Appeals' Plain 
Language Review of Utah's Court Rules 2 
B. In Depicting the Case Law on Requiring Judges to 
Instruct Jurors on the Law at the Close of the Evidence, 
the State Omits the Due Process Foundation of Those 
Cases 
C. All of the Applicable Cases Require the State to Show 
that the Trial Court's Failure to Repeat the Preliminary 
Jury Instructions Was Harmless Beyond a Reasonable 
Doubt 10 
CONCLUSION 12 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES 
Bennett v. State. 789 S.W.2d436 (Ark. 1990) 5, 9,10 
Chapman V.California. 386 U.S. 18 (1967) 9 
Griffith v. State. 444 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. 1994) 10 
Little v. State. 498 S.E.2d 284 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) 5,6, 8, 10, 11 
People v. Newman. 385 N.E.2d 598 (N.Y. 1978) 6, 9 
Preece v. House. 886 P.2d 508 (Utah 1994) 9 
State v.Bell. 754 P.2d 55 (Utah 1988) 9 
State v. Comen. 553 N.E.2d 640 (Ohio 1990) 3, 7, 9,10 
State v. Cruz. No. 20020735-SC 1 
State v. Eagle Star. 558 N.W.2d 70 (S.D. 1996) 4 
State v. Jackson. 695 P.2d 742 (Ariz. 1985) 4, 7 
State v. Marquez. 660 P.2d 1243 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) 7 
State v. Nelson. 587 N.W.2d439 (S.D. 1998) 3, 4, 6,7 
State v. Owens. 632 N.E.2d 1301 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) 9, 10, 11 
State v. Peterson. 673 N.W.2d 482 (Minn. 2004) 5, 6, 11 
State v. Romanoskv. 859 P.2d 741 (Ariz. 1993) 10, 11 
State v. Weaver. No. 20030199-SC 1 
ii 
State v. WOOICOCK ; o A.2d 1377 (Conn. lUv,, 6, 8 
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.60., A 
Minn. R. Crira. P. 26.03. smuh ' 
( > h i o I, I i n n I1 ill . . J 
S.D.C.L. § 15-6-51(a) 4 
Utah R. Crim. P 3. 5. 6. 11 
Utah R. Crim. P 5 1 
1 
iii 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent : 
v. : 
GERMAN CRUZ REYES : Case No. 20040078-SC 
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner : 
INTRODUCTION 
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner German Cruz Reyes files this reply brief to correct 
the State's misportrayal of the case law on requiring trial judges to instruct juries on the 
law at the close of the evidence. Mr. Reyes' previously filed brief in this case and his 
briefs in two companion appeals adequately address the State's arguments on the role of 
and research supporting preliminary jury instructions, construing Utah Rule of Evidence 
19, and the long-ingrained American tradition of instructing jurors at the end of the case. 
See State v. Cruz. No. 20020735; State v. Weaver, No. 20030199. Nevertheless, Mr. 
Reyes is compelled to respond to the State's erroneous characterizations that the cases 
that the Court of Appeals and Mr. Reyes cite are either distinguishable or inapplicable. 
To the contrary, each of those cases supports the Court of Appeals' plain language 
interpretation of Utah's court rules and establish a due process right to instruct the jury 
on the law at the close of the evidence. 
ANALYSIS 
MR. REYES1 CASES AGREE THAT DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW AND THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF SIMILAR 
COURT RULES REQUIRE TRIAL JUDGES TO 
REPEAT PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE 
LAW AT THE CLOSE OF THE EVIDENCE 
In its brief, the State contends that neither this Court's rules nor due process of 
law requires trial judges to instruct jurors on the law at the close of the evidence. State's 
Reply Brief and Brief on Cross-Review at 14-20 (hereinafter referred to as "State's 
Brief1). To the contrary, every court that has addressed court rules similar to this Court's 
has ruled that the plain language of those rules requires trial judges to repeat preliminary 
jury instructions on the law at the end of the proceedings. Likewise, nearly all of these 
courts have explicitly or impliedly ruled that due process of law requires jury instructions 
on the law at the close of the evidence. Despite the State's best efforts to invite this 
Court to doubt these conclusions, the State presents no contrary authority. Because due 
process of law requires closing jury instructions, the Court of Appeals erred in applying a 
simple harmless error standard to the trial judge's failure to repeat the preliminary jury 
instructions on the law. 
A, Case Law Supports the Court of Appeals' 
Plain Language Review of Utah's Court 
Rules, 
In every relevant respect, each of the cases that Mr. Reyes has cited on appeal 
requires instructing the jury on the law at the close of the evidence. First of all, the State 
2 
does not dispute that all of Mr. Reyes9 authorities construed court rules similar to Utah's. 
State's Brief at 16. Nor, does the State contend that those courts held that the plain 
language of their rules required trial judges to instruct jurors on the law at the close of the 
evidence. Id 
Second, the State erroneously contends that "none" of Mr. Reyes' citations address 
court rules or statutes that allow trial judges to instruct jurors at the beginning of trial or at 
"'any other appropriate time'" as does Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(g)(6). IdL To 
the contrary, the principal jurisdictions upon which Mr. Reyes relies similarly allow trial 
judges to give jurors preliminary instructions at the beginning of the trial and/or instruct 
jurors throughout the proceedings. The Ohio Supreme Court, for example, construed its 
rules as requiring closing instructions on the law even though its rules allowed judges to 
instruct the jury at any time during trial. State v. Comen, 553 N.E.2d 640, 644 (Ohio 
1990). Similar to Rule 17(g)(6), Ohio's rules provide that "'[a]t the commencement and 
during the course of the trial, the court may give cautionary and other instructions of law 
relating to trial procedure, credibility and weight of the evidence, and the duty and 
function of the jury and may acquaint the jury generally with the nature of the case.'" Id. 
(quoting Ohio R. Crim. P. 30(B)). This rule is as equally broad as Utah's rules that allow 
instructions at any time. 
Likewise, in State v. Nelson. 587 N.W.2d 439,443-44 (S.D. 1998), the South 
Dakota Supreme Court required trial judges to repeat preliminary instructions at the close 
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of the case even though a statute provided for preliminary jury instructions. The statute in 
that case gave trial judges discretion to "'give general and preliminary instructions to the 
jury on the conduct of the trial but not on substantive issues'" after the jury is sworn but 
before opening statements. (Quoting S.D.C.L. § 15-6-51(a)). Prior to deciding Nelson , 
the South Dakota Supreme Court had interpreted this rule as allowing judges to instruct 
jurors on "their 'function, the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof and other 
preliminary matters aimed at making the trial more understandable.'" IcL at 444 (quoting 
State v. Eagle Star, 558 N.W.2d 70, |20 (S.D. 1996). That court apparently did not view 
the ban on preliminary instructions addressing "substantive issues" as barring such 
instructions. Despite this discretion to give preliminary jury instructions, that court held 
that due of process of law and the plain language of the applicable statutes required 
repeating preliminary jury instructions at the close of the evidence. Id. at 444-45. 
Several other cases have reached the same conclusion. The Arizona Supreme 
Court interpreted its court rules as plainly requiring instructions on the law at the close of 
the evidence. State v. Jackson, 695 P.2d 742, 743 (Ariz. 1985). That court reached this 
conclusion despite a court rule that mandated that "'[immediately after the jury is sworn, 
the court shall instruct the jury concerning its duties, its conduct, the order of proceedings, 
and the elementary legal principles that will govern the proceedings.'" Id. (quoting Ariz. 
R. Crim. P. 18.6(c)). Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court recently required closing 
jury instructions on the law in the face of a similar court rule that allowed for preliminary 
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instructions that would aid "'the jury in comprehending the trial procedures and sequence 
to be followed.5" State v. Peterson, 673 N.W.2d 482, 486 (Minn. 2004) (quoting Minn. 
R. Crim. P. 26.03, subdv. 4). The Peterson court reached this conclusion even though the 
court rule specifically provided that trial judges need not repeat preliminary jury 
instructions at the close of the evidence. Id. at n.4. 
The State further misses the mark because Mr. Reyes' remaining cases do not even 
suggest a different result. Rather, both cases simply do not discuss whether those 
jurisdictions allow for preliminary or mid-trial instructions. Bennett v. State, 789 W.2d 
436, 438-39 (Ark. 1990); Little v. State, 498 S.E.2d 284, 287 (Ga. Ct App. 1998). More 
importantly, both of these cases construe similar court rules to Utah's that mandate trial 
judges to give jurors closing instructions on the law. Bennett, 789 W.2d at 438-39; Little, 
498 S.E.2d at 287. Consistent with the Court of Appeals' decision below, both of these 
cases specifically hold that the plain language of their court rules require instructing jurors 
on the law at the close of the evidence. Bennett, 789 W.2d at 438-39; Little, 498 S.E.2d 
at 287. In any event, both courts encourage giving jurors preliminary and mid-trial 
instructions to improve juror performance and comprehension. Bennett, 789 W.2d at 
438-39; Little, 498 S.E.2d at 287. Thus, the State assumes too much in claiming that 
these cases fail to address court rules similar to Utah's. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 17(g)(6) and 19(g) are indistinguishable from 
the rules that these cases construed. Like the rules and statutes in those cases, Rule 
5 
17(g)(6) (emphasis added) mandates that "[w]hen the e\ tence is concluded and at any 
other appropriate time, the court shall instruct the jury.. . ." Similarly, Rule 19(g) 
(emphasis added) directs that "[arguments of the respective parties shall be made after 
the court has given the jury its final instructions." Just as Mr. Reyes' cases hold, these 
rules require trial judges to instruct jurors on the law at the close of the evidence even 
though judges also have discretion to instruct the jury at the beginning of or during trial. 
B. In Depicting the Case Law on Requiring 
Judges to Instruct Jurors on the Law at the 
Close of the Evidence, The State Omits the Due 
Process Foundation of Those Cases. 
Third, even if these cases did not support Mr. Reyes' plain language analysis, they 
establish a due process right to fully instruct the jury at the close of the evidence. 
Contrary to the State's brief description of these cases, each of the cases that Mr. Reyes 
cites either expressly or implicitly establishes a due process right to give the jury closing 
instructions on the law. In the majority of the cases, courts have required closing jury 
instructions while specifically relying on state and federal due process rights to proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence, and the State shouldering the 
burden of proof. State v. Woolcock, 518 A.2d 1377, 1387 (Conn. 1986); Little, 498 
S.E.2d at 287; Peterson, 673 N.W.2d at 486; People v. Newman, 385 N.E.2d 598, 599 
(N.Y. 1978); Nelson, 587 N.W.2d at 445. Other cases allude to due process rights in 
requiring trial judges to repeat preliminary jury instructions on "vital", "elementary" or 
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"fundamental" rights. Jackson, 695 P.2d at 743; State v. Marquez, 660 P.2d 1243,1249 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)); Comen. 553 N.E.2d at 644. Whether specifically or impliedly, all 
of these cases founded their decisions on due process principles. 
The State further errs in its individual depiction of these cases as not based on due 
process rights. State's Brief at 19-20. For example, the State describes Nelson as 
requiring reversal only because "cumulative errors" merely constituted the denial of 
"substantial rights," including the "statutory" right to instruct jurors at the close of the 
evidence. Id, at 19. But, the State fails to mention that these conclusions only arose 
because the defendant failed to object to the lack of closing instructions which forced the 
court to review the constitutional violation for plain error. Nelson, 587 N.W.2d at 443, 
446-47. Before reaching these conclusions, the Nelson court extensively discussed 
defendants' basic due process rights. Id. at 445. It then specifically ruled that the failure 
to instruct the jury following the presentation of the evidence deprived the defendant of 
the due process right to a "fair trial." Id. The discussion of cumulative error and 
substantial rights was only necessary because the third prong of that court's plain error 
test required defendants to show the denial of "substantial rights." IdL at 443. The Nelson 
court eliminated any doubt about the constitutional basis for its decision in its ultimate 
conclusions that the lack of instructions constituted a "disregard for fundamental trial 
procedures" that were necessary to ensure that the jury's verdict was "reliable." Id. at 447. 
Likewise, the State erroneously dismisses the Georgia Court of Appeals' decision 
7 
in Little as merely stating the "incontrovertible proposition" that failing to instruct juries 
on fundamental due process rights violates state and federal constitutional protections. 
State's Brief at 19. Again, the State omits that court's explicit ruling that failing to give 
jurors closing instructions on the law violated due process principles: 
The presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and 
the standard of proof are the fundamental doctrines of American 
criminal jurisprudence and the bedrock of determining guilt or 
innocence in a criminal case. The failure of the trial court to 
give such charges would be a violation of the defendant's state 
and federal constitutional due process rights. 
498 S.E.2d at 287. Eliminating any possible doubt about the constitutional basis for its 
ruling, Little held that f,[t]he failure of the trial court . . . to recharge on the presumption of 
innocence and burden of proof was a state and federal constitutional due process 
violation." kLat288n.l . 
The State similarly fails to disclose the due-process based reasoning in Woolcock, 
518 A.2d 1377. The defendant there contended that preliminary jury instructions violated 
his right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. Id, at 1385. The Connecticut Supreme 
Court agreed with commentators, researchers, and scholars that support granting trial 
judges discretion to give preliminary jury instructions "so long as the jury is again fully 
instructed at the close of the proceedings." Id. at 1387. Because the central question in 
Woolcock was the constitutionality of instructing jurors before the end of the case, the 
court's decision to condition such instructions on trial judges' repeating the instructions at 
the end of the case means, by definition, that the decision is constitutionally based. 
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Similarly relying on due process requirements, the decision in Newman, 385 
N.E.2d at 599, specifically invoked "the fundamental nature of the constitutional precept 
that each essential element of a crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Likewise, in Comen, 553 N.E.2d at 644, the Ohio Supreme Court required trial judges to 
repeat preliminary instructions on "matters of law vital to the rights of a defendant." In 
any event, even if Comen could be read as based on nonconstitutional grounds, the Ohio 
Court of Appeals later criticized such a reading. In State v. Owens, 632 N.E.2d 1301, 
1305-06 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993), that court disagreed with Comen 's application of a simple 
harmless error analysis because it ruled that failing to re-instruct the jury at the close of 
the evidence constituted "'federal constitutional error.'" IjL_ (quoting Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). 
The State's remaining arguments fail because Mr. Reyes' citations implicitly but 
plainly rely on due process grounds in requiring trial judges to repeat preliminary jury 
instructions on the law. Although the State correctly observes that the decision in 
Bennett, 789 S.W.2d 436, does not appear to be constitutionally based, the court in that 
case rested its decision, in part, on the due-process type concern that instructing different 
juries on the law at different times would arbitrarily result in "changes in verdicts." Id. at 
439. It is axiomatic that due process encompasses the procedural right to be free from the 
arbitrary or irrational denial of liberty. See, e.g., Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508, 512 
(Utah 1994) (right to procedural due process in parole proceedings); State v. Bell, 754 
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P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1988) (right to procedural due process in sentencing). Based on this 
concern, the court ruled that "[n]o person should have his [or her] liberty judged under 
such circumstances." Bennett, 789 S.W.2d at 439. Thus, all of Mr. Reyes' citations either 
explicitly base their decisions on due process requirements or phrase their holdings in due 
process terms. 
C. AH of the Applicable Cases Require The State 
to Show that the Trial Court's Failure to 
Repeat the Preliminary Jury Instructions Was 
Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
Finally, the State mischaracterizes Mr. Reyes' cases on harmless error review. 
Numerous courts have implicitly found due process violations for the failure to instruct 
jurors at the end of the evidence because they review such failings under the 
constitutionally-required harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. S tate v. 
Romanoskv. 859 P.2d 741, 744 (Ariz. 1993)); Little, 498 S.E.2d at 287; Owens. 632 
N.E.2d at 1306. In fact, the State incorrectly implies that both the Georgia and Ohio 
Supreme Courts have rejected a due process analysis because they have reviewed failures 
to instruct jurors on the law at the close of the evidence for simple harmlessness. State's 
Brief at 21-22 (citing Griffith v. State. 444 S.E.2d 794, 795-96 (Ga. 1994) and Comen, 
553 N.E.2d at 644). Like its other omissions, the State fails to disclose that the Georgia 
and Ohio Courts of Appeals specifically discounted the harmless error analyses in Griffith 
and Comen. See Little, 498 S.E.2d at 287; Owens, 632 N.E.2d at 1306. Both courts 
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rejected their supreme courts' analyses and ruled that failing to instruct jurors on the law 
at the end of the case constituted federal constitutional violations that required the State to 
show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. Little. 498 S.E.2d at 287; Owens, 632 
N.E.2datl306. 
In sum, all of Mr. Reyes' citations support his plain language analysis of Rules 
17(g)(6) and 19(g) and his constitutional right to instruct jurors on the law at the close of 
the evidence. The State cites no cases to contradict these conclusions. Thus, the only 
question for this Court is whether the failure to so instruct the jury constitutes structural 
error or, instead, requires the State to prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Peterson. 673 N.W.2d at 486; Romanoskv. 859 P.2d at 744. As explained in Mr. Reyes' 
brief on cross-certiorari review, he prevails under either standard as well as under the 
cumulative error doctrine. Appellant's Brief at 44-48. 
11 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in the briefs in this and the other two 
companion cases, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the trial judge violated Utah 
law in refusing to repeat the preliminary jury instructions at the close of the evidence. 
Further, because that error violated basic due process protections, Mr. Reyes is entitled to 
a new trial both as a matter of law and because the error was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt in this credibility contest. 
Submitted, this /a*t day of November, 2004. 
KEtfT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
-sz£^ 
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